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Abstract
As the variety of methods used by biblical scholars mul­
tiplies, new sub-disciplines are being born that all too 
often leave specialists isolated from each other. While 
at some points the various methods com plem ent each 
other, at others they rem ain contradictory or mutually 
exclusive. Two of the newer such methods, literary criti­
cism and social-science criticism , have until now re ­
mained in isolation. In recent months, however, a dialo­
gue has begun to emerge that seeks to explore the com­
mon ground or lack thereof between these two methods.
This article is a beginning reflection by a social-science 
critic on some of the issues involved.
Biblical scholarship is perhaps at a m ajor crossroads in its m odem  de­
velopment as regards the nature o f  biblical narratives. It has been diffi­
cult to decide whether biblical narratives are about real orfictive events.
(Funk 1988:296)
A t issue in the debate is the question o f  which should dom inate in tex­
tual interpretation, the information internal (intrinsic) to the text or con­
textual information that is external (extrinsic) to the text, like the author’s 
intent, his biography or the historical and cultural climate o f  his times.
(Petersen 1985:6)
Currently, however, the debate among literary critics hinges on the re­
lated question o f  just how determinitive even intrinsic textual informa-
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tion is o f  our understanding and interpretation o f texts. One polar posi- 
tion in the debate is that o f  radical determinacy (e g, E  D Hirsdi), in 
which it is believed that valid interpretations can be arrived at; the other 
polar position is that o f  radical indeterminacy (eg, J  Derrida), in which it 
is believed that we cannot validly interpret a text because texts have many 
meanings, not merely one right one.
(Petersen 1985:6)
The three quotations above locate the ground from which most of the emerging dis­
cussion between social science and literary critics arises.' Strictly speaking, of cour­
se, not all the arguments are special ones between literary and social-science critics. 
Some are betw een literary critics and individuals doing historical analysis of any 
kind, while others are among literary critics themselves. Yet in one way or another 
almost all of them are arguments in which social-science critics have a stake.
O ne enters this conversation, of course, with a certain am ount of trepidation. 
The undertones of ideological suspicion are everywhere in the literature as the ad­
vocates of interpretive determinacy and objectivity on one side battle the claimants 
of indeterminacy and free play on the other. Terms like ‘authoritarian’ and ‘purita­
nical’ fly in one direction while labels like ‘escapist’ and ‘nihilist’ fly in the other. All 
of that is best left aside.
Several im portant areas of controversy are worthy of note. First, there is the na­
ture of narrative texts. Are the gospel texts to be understood as fiction? Are they 
historical? O r is the realism in them to be construed primarily as literary verisimili­
tude? Equally fundam ental is the question about where and how meaning emerges. 
Is meaning fixed by the intention of the author? Is it located in the texts them sel­
ves? Is som ething external to the text to which the text points? O r does meaning 
emerge from the interaction of text and context?
We also may ask if meaning emerges in the interaction of text and reader(s)? If 
it does, w hat is the relative w eight of reader and text in this regard? And what 
about multiple readers? If each reader interacts with the text differently, do texts al­
ways have m ultiple meanings? If so, where are the limits and what are the criteria 
of validity in in terpretation? There is also the question about the nature of lang­
uage? Is language sufficiently determ inative that meaning can be specified? Vali­
dated? Does the possibility of multiple meanings vitiate the historical character of a 
text?
A related concern has to do with the formal properties of texts. Are they aes­
thetic objects? Are the formal markers, either deep structures or surface grammar, 
a key to meaning? Are they sufficient? How are the literary properties of a text re­
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lated to its content? Equally important, but rarely asked, is a question about the re­
lationship between the formal properties of the text and the world external to it.
Finally, we may ask, in what sense do authors m atter? Are narrative texts com­
munications from someone, to someone, about something? That is, do the texts tell 
us something? O r are they ‘stories’ in the technical sense -  that is, do they show us 
som ething? We might even ask if they invite us to participate in something? That 
is, should we understand them as language events -  perhaps ones which the text ini­
tiates but the reader completes?
Many other questions could be asked, of course, but perhaps these are the cen­
tral ones at issue. Obviously not all of them can be taken on in a limited space. Fur­
thermore, in addressing any of the controversies a whole spectrum of answers is pos­
sible and any answer will depend on the assumptions one makes going in. If the de- 
terminacy of language is radically questioned, for example, there can be little sub­
stance to an argument about whether the texts are fiction or history. Likewise, if we 
assume that meaning is permanently fixed in the text, interpretation is largely a m at­
ter of historical inquiry and there is little point to hermeneutics.
None of these are m atters to be taken for granted, of course, because they are 
the very substance of the disagreements among us. Moreover, it is im portant in this 
regard to recognise that not all literary critics treat these m atters in the same fas­
hion. Some assume the complete autonomy of the text (new criticism), but not all. 
Nor do all imagine limitless polyvalency. Not all question the determ inacy of lan­
guage. M oreover, many literary critics are open to historical questions, including 
the kind asked by those interested in the heuristic use of the social sciences.
Before jum ping into a discussion o f the issues them selves, however, a word 
about presuppositions is in order. There are several underlying the work of virtually 
all social science critics that are im portant to understand. First, the fundam ental 
working assumption of social science criticism is that language always encodes a so­
cial system. It is always concrete social communication and never a closed system of 
objective signs. Language brings to expression a system of shared perceptions and 
values and thereby gives each of us a sense of ‘world’ which we share with those so­
cialised in a similar way. In a very critical sense, language reifies world and thereby 
constructs world. Thus as Peter Berger (B erger & Luckmann 1966; Berger 1967) 
and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann 1966) have reminded us, ‘life-world’ is 
always a codification of a social reality. M oreover, as Beidelman (1970:30) points 
out, language is more than simply grammar, syntax and vocabulary. It is ra ther ‘the 
sum total of ways in which the members of a society symbolise or categorise their ex­
perience so that they may give it order and form’. Language thus includes ‘not only 
words but gestures, facial expressions, clothing and even household furnishings -  in
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short, total symbolic behavior’. Understood in this sense, language requires the kind 
of social semiotic analysis that underlies virtually all social science criticism.
Second, social-science critics take seriously the fact that thought, writing, read­
ing and interpreting always take place in a particular social location and that these 
social locations play a critical role in the way language functions. With anthropolo­
gists of knowledge we take for granted the basic insight that there is a fundam ental 
relationship betw een thought and the social conditions under which it occurs. This 
means that texts, like thoughts, always exist in relationship with what P eter Berger 
calls a ‘plausibility structure’, a socially constructed province of meaning in which 
certain things make sense.
The crucial feature of any social location, of course, is that it limits the range of 
experience open to  a group or individual. In this way it limits the range of presup­
positions, perceptions and plausible alternatives any group is likely to encounter. It 
is not tha t certain  experiences produce certain  perceptions, but ra ther that given 
certain  experiences a limited range of perceptions should be plausible options for 
most of those sharing the social location. Even if rejected for other alternatives, a 
given perception should be understood by those who share the range of common ex­
perience. A social location, therefore, is always a heuristic construct, not a causal 
mechanism (Ro.hrbaugh 1987:113-115).
All of this is a way of saying, of course, that our sense of ‘reality’ is itself a social 
construct, and it is therefore to be understood as ‘fictive’ in the same sense that nar­
rative texts are fictive. ‘Reality’ is not an objective item that can be set over against 
the fictive world of the text as if it were of a different order. The contrast between 
fictive world and real world is a false one. But for social-science critics it is most im­
portant to recognise that sense of reality is socially constructed. It may vary in some 
m easure for individuals in the same society, but it remains profoundly social in cha­
racter. A nd this m eans that, like language, thoughts and fexts, so also the acts of 
w riting, read ing  and in terpre ting  can never be construed as merely textual acts. 
They are social acts as well. They all occur in and are limited by a particular social 
location. They all participate in the fictive character of all hum an symbolic in ter­
action.
Such then are the assumptions most social science critics make going in. To us 
they are essential, the sine qua non  of textual interpretation. With these presuppo­
sitions in front of us, therefore, we must turn directly to a discussion of what is at 
stake for us as social science critics when we read a text. We may begin by saying 
tha t social-science critics are  com m itted to a historical reading of biblical texts. 
Since we have our own angle from which to view that m atter, however, it is im por­
tant to think about it at several distinct levels. Obviously we are not talking about a
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historicising naiveté which assumes a one-to-one relationship betw een stories and 
events.
Initially an assertion of historical interest might be construed to get us into the 
ongoing debate about the relation of the gospel texts to the real history of Jesus of 
N azareth. T hat is obviously a historical question at its most basic level. Yet while 
that debate is an im portant one which, in many ways, is at a crossroads in New Tes­
tam ent scholarship right now, and much as it might be appropriate to com m ent in 
o rder to discuss thoroughly the nature of fictive, fictional and historical narratives, 
space perm its only a few simple comments. (See Funk 1988:295-298 for a discussion 
of the current anguish over the question of historicity.)
In assessing historical claims about the New Testam ent, social science criticism 
can make a substantial new contribution. By showing the ways in which the texts en­
code the social system, we can help to evaluate the plausibility o f historical claims 
made on o ther grounds. We can tem per the scepticism that literary scholars som e­
times dem onstrate (because the texts are technically fictive in nature) by helping to 
determ ine if it is literary verisim ilitude or actual historical interest that is being as­
serted regarding a text. We also can help to distinguish among historical claims. If 
we can show the plausibility o f a story in the social setting of village life, for exam­
ple, it is a far be tter candidate for historical data about Jesus than a story whose 
only plausible setting is the pre-industrial city (see Oakm an 1986). W ithout recour­
se to the social-sciences, the judgem ent that a text is or is not historical is all too of­
ten m ade on ethnocentric or anachronistic grounds. We rightly insist, therefore, 
that anyone trying to assert that a text claims no historical referent, or that a particu­
lar referen t is or is not historical, should do so in explicitly socio-historical terms. 
Claims based on the latest ideological version of western idealism are singularly un­
persuasive.
It is also possible, of course, to raise historical questions about literature other 
than allegedly historical narratives. With fictional narrative -  parables for example
-  the ground shifts slightly and forces us to address historical concerns at new levels. 
O ne of these has to  do with what literary critics call ‘verisim ilitude’ -  referred  to 
above (also called ‘recuperation’, ‘naturalisation’, ‘motivation’ -  see Funk 1988:293; 
Tolbert 1989:30, especially note 19), that is, with the ‘realism’ that even parables use 
in order to establish plausibility for a story. The social-science critic’s concern for 
history can have much to say about how verisimilitude is created. Plausible stories, 
like plausible language, whether intentionally historical or intentionally fictional, are 
always em bedded in a social system and always encode it in very substantial ways. 
W ithout that, the verisimilitude the fiction w riter requires would not be possible at
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all. O ur concern then is that, even when dealing with fictional texts, the socially and 
historically dated character of the encoding system comes into play.
A good example can be found in the recent work of the Jesus Sem inar of the 
W estar Institute (Sonom a, California). In reading through the report of the Jesus 
Sem inar on the parables of Jesus one gets the impression that of the many criteria 
for authenticity  the authors claim to use, one predom inates (Funk, Scott & Butts 
1988). It is the belief that Jesus’ authentic parables pose ‘outrageous’ or ‘highly 
exaggerated’ situations for the reader to ponder. The authors readily acknowledge 
that the m etaphors in parables are taken from everyday life, yet they claim that ‘Je ­
sus chooses m etaphors that surprise (the leaven as as figure of the holy), or that ex­
aggerate (everyone refuses to come to a dinner), or that satirise (the mustard seed 
pokes fun at the mighty cedar that represents Israel). The reader must always look 
for the surprising twist in the story, the unusual figure, the paradoxical p a tte rn ’ 
(Funk et al 1988:16). TTie problem here, of course, is that one must know the typical 
before one can designate som ething atypical or surprising. The com m ent noted 
above about all the guests refusing to come when invited to a dinner provides an 
example. This k en a rio  struck the Jesus Seminar participants as outrageous, exagge­
rated  behaviour. They trea ted  it as atypical (Funk et al 1988:43). But how could 
they know this? In fact, exactly the opposite might have been be the case. Double 
invitations that anticipated such difficulties were com m onplace in antiquity. They 
are discussed in both the papyri and the Mishnah, and indeed examples of all the in­
vited dinner guests not showing up exist elsewhere in the literature.^ The situation 
is not atypical, exaggerated or outrageous at all. The parable may or may not be 
authentic, but the criterion has been mistakenly applied because the social situation 
of antiquity has not been taken seriously.^ The Jesus Seminar Report imagines mo­
dern dinner parties and the attitudes of modern hosts and on this basis makes a his­
torical judgement.'* In his recent book on parables, Brandon Scott (1989:67-68) re­
cognises this problem, acknowledging that we must know first what is typical before 
we can pronounce something atypical, but he then claims that only literary concerns 
are at issue. This brings us to yet ano ther level at which social-science critics are 
com m itted to a historical reading of the texts. If we are right in making the claim 
that language encodes a social system, and if the social system that New Testam ent 
language encodes is that of the M editerranean world in the agrarian period, then 
the key to deciphering the language o f the New Testam ent cannot be derived from 
social systems o ther than the one that produced it. H ere the in terp re ter makes a 
consciously historical choice. H istorical or social location is not simply the ‘back­
ground’ of a text. It is encoded, embedded, reflected and responded to in a text. It 
is not a point of reference for a text, it is the text and the text is it. And since this
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system of social conventions is itself a historical reality, a reality of another time, 
ano ther place and another culture, it must be uncovered and recovered in order to 
understand in what way the text is an em bodim ent of it. Social-science criticism is 
thus historical in a very fundam ental sense: it assumes that a social system of the 
past, from a culture that precedes the industrial revolution, is the necessary key to 
understanding the language in the text. And that is true w hether the text claims a 
historical referent or not. The verisimilitude and its contravention on which para­
bles depend is itself dependent on a historically locatable social system that the text 
encodes.
R elated  to  this concern over the use of verisim ilitude in the parable texts, of 
course, is the assertion of some literary critics that biblical texts, and particularly the 
parables, are to be construed as rhetorical-aesthetic objects and therefore studied 
primarily for their formal properties as art. For some critics this allows discussion of 
the parables apart from any consideration of their historical or social location be­
cause meaning is construed to emerge from the characteristics of the text as text, not 
from the encoding of the social system in the text.
We can leave aside the controversy over the degree to which formal characteris­
tics in a text carry the freight claimed for them , though some structuralist claims 
about univer.sality of pattern have rightly been criticised by both historians and an­
thropologists. For social science critics the main problem in some treatm ents of for­
mal properties has once again to do with our concern for anachronism  and ethno- 
centrism . We rightly ask w hether the forms the critics claim to see are constructs 
conditioned by the social location of the critics themselves.5 An example of the eth­
nocentric danger in judgem ents about form can be seen in Mary Ann Tolbert’s re­
cent work on Mark. Wearing her literary hat, Tolbert claims that one of the key dif­
ferences between ancient and modern fiction is that in modern fiction ‘character’ is 
highly developed whereas in ancient literature it is portrayed in a ‘flat, stereo-typi­
cal, passive and static m anner’ (Tolbert 1989:76). She notes especially that the ‘il­
lustrative characters of ancient literature are static, monolithic figures who do not 
grow or develop p.sychologically’ (T olbert 1989:77). To her credit she argues that 
we must take this difference seriously, but like many literary analysts she treats this 
formal feature as if it were a simple result of the rudimentary quality o f ancient fic­
tion. She seems unaware that flat, stereotypical characterisations are an encoding of 
the ancient M editerranean social system which understood all people in that way in 
real life. Likewise, she seems unaware that the psychological, introspective charac­
ter of W estern novels encodes the social system in which we live and in which we ty­
pically view human nature in those terms. We are introspective. Ancient M editer­
ranean people were not, for reasons having to do with honour-sham e values and
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dyadic views of personality (M alina 1979:126-138; Malina 1989:127-141). The diffe­
rences are thus much more than literary. They are social and historical as well. We 
must always ask, therefore, the degree to which aesthetic and formalistic considera­
tions are in the anachronistic and ethnocentric eye of the beholder.
O ne additional and fundam ental controversy in which we as social science cri­
tics have a stake has to do with the so called relation of text and context. As N or­
man Petersen (1985:6) points out, these are ‘the two principle sources o f inform a­
tion bearing on the interpretation of texts’ though a substantial argum ent exists over 
which should dom inate interpretation, information internal to the text or contextual 
inform ation that comes from outside. H ere we begin to confront one of the most 
im portant issues in our discussion: How and where does textual meaning em erge? 
Many, o f course, acknowledge that text and context in teract in the production of 
meaning. W hatever weight they may assign to context, they assume that it provides 
the backdrop for reading and interpretation. Unfortunately, however, that does not 
quite say enough for either the historian or the social science critic.^
At the outset we acknowledged that the so called ‘rea l’ world is itself a fictive 
construct. It does not differ in kind from the fictive world that narrative creates. 
T hat contrast is a fal.se one that drives a non-existent wedge between text and con­
text. And, most emphatically, we would argue that real world, context, call it what 
you will, cannot be simply ‘background’ for reading a text. That likewise implies the 
two are discreet realities. But the text encodes, is embedded in, reflects, responds to 
and is inextricably dependent on the social life-world it embodies. Divorce it from 
that world and it is no longer the same text. The point is a critical one. Removed 
from its social location in the M editerranean world of the first century, a parable is 
no longer the same parable. A fter all, the plausibility the parables a ttem pt to in­
voke is a plausibility in their world, not ours. An additional problem, now widely re­
cognised by literary critics themselves, is that construing text and context as separa­
ble entities not only fails to take social location seriously, it fails to take the reader 
in to  account as well. R eaders, at least real readers, do stand outside the text. 
M oreover, they do so in a particular social location of their own. This means that 
the question of meaning cannot be divorced from the question about who is doing 
the reading. Texts without contexts are no less complete than texts without readers. 
And that is because the real reader brings to the act o f reading a world of h is /her 
own, from which a great deal is drawn into the conversation as text and reader inter­
act.
It is obvious that not everything necessary to a conversation can be written down 
because a text simply cannot say everything that needs to be known about a topic 
under discussion. To do so would be tedious in the extreme and clutter the text to
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the point of unreadability. InesitaDly, then, there is much that must be left to the 
imagination of the reader because an author depends on a reader to fill in the gaps 
from the life-world they share in common. Successful com m unication can be car­
ried on in no other way (M alina 1991:3-24).
Thinking about m odern w estern readers reading ancient M editerranean texts 
requires us to clarify the situation one step further. Each time a text is read by a 
new reader, the fields of reference tend to shift and multiply because each new rea­
der fills in the text in a unique way. Among literary theorists this phenom enon is 
usually called ‘recontextualisation’, a term  referring to the multiple ways different 
readers may ‘com plete’ a text as a result of reading it from within their different so­
cial locations. (Texts may also be ‘decontextualised’ when read ahistorically for 
their aesthetic o r formal characteristics.) Such recontextualisation is of course a 
fam iliar phenom enon to students of the Synoptic Gospels. It is nicely illustrated in 
the work of redaction critics, for example, who have shown us how shifts in the set­
tings of the parables of Jesus in the various gospels have altered their emphasis an d / 
or m eaning (e g the parable of the Lost Sheep in Mt 18:12-13; Lk 15:4-6; Thomas 
98:22-27). In whatever measure each of these new recontextualisations of the Jesus- 
story ‘com plete’ the text unlike an original hearer of Jesus might have done, an in­
terpretative step of significant proportions has been taken.
The same is true for recontextualisations into the world of the modern reader. 
Moving the text from the M editerranean culture continent in which it was written to 
the new setting in the W estern, industrialised society where it is now read, is a very 
far-reaching recontextualisation indeed. No New Testam ent writer ever imagined a 
tw entieth century American as a real, implied or ideal reader. The social locations 
of the original audience(s) and the m odern audience(s) differ in such significant 
m easure that neither audience could be expected to  com plete the unw ritten e le ­
ments of the text in the same way. O f critical im portance for social science critics 
therefore is the recognition that this particular recontextualisation, this modernisa­
tion of the text, is itself profoundly social in character. R eaders socialised in the in­
dustrial world are unlikely to com plete the text of the New T estam ent in ways the 
ancient authors could have imagined. We simply do not intuitively know the social 
system the language encodes.
O ne final issue we might discuss is the m atter of authorial intent, especially in 
so far as it bears on the sense in which texts are communication from one p>erson to 
another. In recent literary studies, of course, it is common to pronounce ‘intentional 
fallacy’ upon any attem pt to imagine what the original author had in mind. Literary 
analysts are sharply critical of attem pts to ‘get inside the head of the author’ in the 
hope of estimating what he/she might have intended. Since the gospel authors can­
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not be questioned, it is assumed we cannot probe their intentions in any substantial 
way. M oreover, since different readers complete tfie text differently, it is assumed 
that it cannot have a single, that is authorial, meaning anyway. Yet one need not 
hold the extrem e position of E D Hirsch that authorial intent is both available and 
determ inative of all meaning in order to ask if the texts are communication in some 
real sense?’̂  If they are, they are what som eone (an author) m eant to say to some­
one else (a reader) about som ething in particular. We may not be able to discover 
fully what that is, but that does not mean we cannot discover anything about it at all. 
No one would claim, for example, that the gospel writers were talking about nuclear 
disarmam ent. But there is another thing to be said here. As W alter Benn Michaels 
(1983:344) has shown, ‘language can only be understood as a set of intentional acts,’ 
and thus ‘to use language at all [as speaker, hearer, writer or reader] is to acknow­
ledge the centrality of in tention’. He argues that ‘what a text means and what the 
author intends it to mean are the same thing,’ hence interpretation is largely a m at­
ter o f trying to figure out what this intention might be (M ichaels 1983:344). O r as 
Stanley Fish (1983:283) puts it; ‘It is impossible not to construe it [intention]’ in the 
act of interpreting. This is not, of course, an argum ent that we can get inside the 
head of an author. The point Fish (1983:283) seeks to make is rather that intentions 
are a form of ‘conventional’ behaviour and are to be ‘conventionally’ read. So that 
instead of referring the m atter of intention back to an original author, an individual, 
a social science critic will insist that it be referred back to an original system of so­
cial conventions that has left its mark in the encoding conventions of the text.
In this connection, some literary critics, particularly in parable research, are un­
easy about claims of authorial intent because they argue that parables have no in­
tended message, no subject m atter in any direct sense. Being inherently polyvalent, 
they suggest that parables are not information about anything but rather are lang­
uage events m eant to explode the world of the hearer/reader and open up possibili­
ties for a new ‘world’ to come into being.
But as Terry Eagleton (1983:79) points out, such a theory is both anachronistic 
and ethnocentric. It is ‘based on a liberal humanist ideology: a belief that in reading 
we should be flexible and open-m inded, prepared to put our beliefs into question 
and allow them to be transform ed.’ The ideal reader, the com petent reader, is the 
liberal humanist. An ideologically committed reader is a.ssumed to be an inadequa­
te reader since he/she is ‘less likely to be open to the transformative power of litera­
ry works’ (Eagleton 1983:79). Moreover, as Eagleton (1983:79) points out, the irony 
here is that the claim ed character of the text (open-ended) aims at producing the 
very kind of reader (open-m inded) that it already presupposes. In fact, if the text 
really m eans to explode our pre-existing convictions, and thus if holding one’s con­
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victions rather lightly is the pre-condition of com petent reading, then ‘having them 
interrogated and subverted by the text is not really very significant’ after all. The 
irony here, of course, is that even an open-ended parable is a text with a definable 
authorial intent. It ‘intends’ to explode the life-world and assumptions of the reader. 
But even beyond this is the fact that if texts are absolute in the sense that they can 
be divorced from all questions of authorial intent, they are also separable from the 
social context of origin and hence are treated not only ahistorically but also asocial- 
ly. Such an approach lends itself to the excessive individualism of W estern societies, 
but depends upon a virtual denial of the anthropology of knowledge and the social 
location of thought. Looming large here, of course, is the m atter of multiple m ean­
ings in texts or, as some literary critics would prefer to put it, the m atter of determi- 
nacy and indeterminacy. In denying the value of authorial intent, some critics seek 
to make room for the kind of polyvalence that has been elevated to essence in para­
ble studies, though most argue that polyvalence exists in virtually all texts w hether 
parables or not. This is an im portant issue since it is clear that if a text can mean 
anything, it really means nothing at all: It is merely a vehicle for what its latest rea­
der wishes to say. Nor can a completely polyvalent text be construed as communica­
tion in any strict sense of the term. There is ra ther w idespread agreem ent, there ­
fore, that limits on polyvalence exist even if not all agree on where or how to place 
them. The one item on which all social science critics would insist, however, is that 
a particular social system represents a control on multivalency that we cannot over­
look. A limited range of experience means a limited range of plausibility structures 
and therefore a limited range of meanings. The new and novel are always possible, 
but even they participate in the dominant social matrix. The issue here, of course, is 
validity in interpretation and in her new book on Mark, Mary Ann Tolbert (1989:10- 
13) lists several criteria for ‘adjudicating’ among a list of multiple interpretations. 
T hese criteria  are  not to be used, she argues, to discrim inate betw een ‘right and 
wrong’ interpretations (which are in theory ruled out), but rather between in terpre­
tations that are more or less ‘persuasive’ to ‘m odern’ readers. We may note in pas­
sing that the problem s with T o lbert’s list are legion, hence some would no doubt 
want to form ulate it differently. But the real issue here is not the adequacy of Tol­
bert’s list. It is ra ther that any list of criteria for validity in in terpretation  must be 
prefaced with a critical assumption. Unless we buy into the fallacy of the autono­
mous text, authorial intent (whether or not we can say fully what it is) and authorial 
location in the M editerranean world of the first century mean that plausible inter­
pretations, if they are truly interpretations and not platforms, and if they are truly in­
terpretations of this text ra ther than some other, are lim ited to those that address 
the authorial audience, not the m odern one. E thnocentric and anachronistic read­
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ings may be interesting, but they fail to take seriously a communicative dimension in 
the text, they disrespect the very creativity of the au thor which the literary critic 
claims to be constitutive of the text and they allow the needs of the modern reader 
(‘interesting’, ‘persuasive to the m odern reader’) to overshadow the text to such de­
gree that it ceases to be little more than a set of directions for self-expression. We 
thus em phatically assert the need to take authorial intent -  in the sense of social 
convention -  seriously if an in terpre tation  is claim ed to be an in terpre tation  of a 
particular text rather than some other one.
Obviously these questions and reflections could go on. But in looking over the 
ramblings above, it seems that a number of m atters stand out for those who are inte­
rested in the social sciences and New T estam ent interpretation. It really does m at­
ter to us that authors, texts, audiences, readers and meanings are understood to en­
code and incarnate historically and culturally locatable social systems. It does m at­
ter that the range of meanings in a text is limited by the social system the text en ­
codes and that wrenching it away from that system irretrievably alters the text. It 
does m atte r to  us tha t texts are com m unication and that they have authors with 
something to .say. And finally, it m atters to us that writing, reading, hearing and in­
terpreting are all, in a fundamental and inviolable .sense, the most social of acts.
Endnotes
1. The first significant discussions took place at the 1991 Society of Biblical Lite­
rature Meeting in Kansas City. Further efforts are planned for 1992 and 1993.
2. Cf Lam R 4:2; see also Es 5:8; 6:14; Philo, O pif 78. For the papyri see Kim 
(1975).
3. For a discussion of the parable of the G reat Banquet in a social-science pers­
pective, see Rohrbaugh (1991).
4. For further discussion of the problem of ethnocentfic historical judgements, see 
Freyne (1988:19) and Sanders (1985:7,125-129).
5. This la tter point is nicely made in the work of Terry Eagleton (1983:108) who 
argues that treating texts apart from the social and historical settings that pro­
duced them is, after all, just the latest chapter in the history of classical W estern 
idealism.
6. To those interested in history, especially social history, and convinced of its cru­
cial place in textual interpretation, the ‘new historicism’ is a welcome reaction 
(see Lentricchia 1980).
7. For an excellent discussion of the weakness of H irsch’s position, see Eagleton 
(1983:67-74).
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